In the eyes of the public, the prominent feature of the Cynic was his

contemptuous jeering, and sarcastic abuse of everybody around
In the eyes of the public, the prominent feature of the Cynic was his
contemptuous jeering, and sarcastic abuse of everybody around. The
name (Cynic, dog-like) denotes this peculiarity. The anecdotes
relating to Diogenes illustrate his coarse denunciation of men in
general and their luxurious ways. He set at defiance all the
conventions of courtesy and of decency; spoke his mind on everything
without fear or remorse; and delighted in his antagonism to public
opinion. He followed the public and obtrusive life of Sokrates, but
instead of dialectic skill, his force lay in vituperation, sarcasm,
and repartee. "To Sokrates," says Epiktetus, "Zeus assigned the
cross-examining function; to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising
function; to Zeno (the Stoic), the didactic and dogmatical."

The only difficulty lies in overcoming the inertia of acquired habits

The only difficulty lies in overcoming the inertia of acquired habits.
After one has changed his habits, it is just as easy to live rightly as
to live wrongly. The rules of hygiene are not restrictive, but
liberating. They may seem at first restrictive, for they prohibit many
things which we have been in the habit of doing; but they are really
liberating, for the things we were doing were unrealized restrictions on
our own power to work, to be useful, or even to enjoy life. The 'rules'
of hygiene are thus simply the means of emancipating us from our real
limitations. These so-called rules, when tried, will prove to be not
artificial but natural, not difficult but easy, not complicated but
simple. They are almost as simple as the direction to bathe in the river
Jordan. It is, in fact, their very simplicity and availability to which
is largely due their deplorable neglect and the failure to realize the
wonderful benefits following their careful and continued observance.

After these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion,

which, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly
speak of them in common
After these three motives, Bentham places the Dictates of Religion,
which, however, are so various in their suggestions, that he can hardly
speak of them in common. Were the Being, who is the object of religion,
universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise
and powerful, and were the notions of his benevolence as correct as the
notions of his wisdom and power, the dictates of religion would
correspond, in all cases, with Utility. But while men call him
benevolent in words, they seldom mean that he is so in reality. They do
not mean that he is benevolent as man is conceived to be benevolent;
they do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense that
benevolence has a meaning. The dictates of religion are in all
countries intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to
utility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of the writings
held for sacred by each sect. These dictates, however, gradually
approach nearer to utility, because the dictates of the moral sanction
do so.