In January, 1833, the House of Representatives, under an order

introduced by Mr
In January, 1833, the House of Representatives, under an order
introduced by Mr. Marsh, of Dalton, appointed a committee 'to consider
the expediency of investing a portion of the proceeds of the sales of
the lands of this commonwealth in a permanent fund, the interest of
which should be annually applied, as the Legislature should from time to
time direct, for the encouragement of common schools.' The adoption of
this order was the incipient measure that led to the establishment of
the Massachusetts School Fund. On the twenty-third of the same month,
Mr. Marsh submitted the report of the committee. The committee acted
upon the expectation that all moneys then in the treasury derived from
the sale of public lands, and the entire proceeds of all subsequent
sales, were to be set apart as a fund for the encouragement of common
schools; but, as blanks were left in the bill reported, they seem not to
have been sanguine of the liberality of the Legislature. The cash and
notes on hand amounted to $234,418.32, and three and a half millions of
acres of land unsold amounted, at the estimated price of forty cents per
acre, to $1,400,000 more; making together a fund with a capital of
$1,634,418.32. The income was estimated at $98,065.09. It was also
stated that there were 140,000 children in the state between the ages of
five and fifteen years, and it was therefore expected that the income of
the fund would permit a distribution to the towns of seventy cents for
each child between the afore-named ages. This certainly was a liberal
expectation, compared with the results that have been attained. The
distributive share of each child has amounted to only about one-third of
the sum then contemplated. The committee were careful to say, 'It is not
intended, in establishing a school fund, to relieve towns and parents
from the principal expense of education; but to manifest our interest
in, and to give direction, energy, and stability to, institutions
essential to individual happiness and the public welfare.' In
conclusion, the committee make the following inquiries and suggestions:

Aristotle thus lays down the outline of man"s supreme Good or

Happiness: which he declares to be the beginning or principle [Greek:
archae] of his deductions, and to be obtained in the best way that the
subject admits
Aristotle thus lays down the outline of man"s supreme Good or
Happiness: which he declares to be the beginning or principle [Greek:
archae] of his deductions, and to be obtained in the best way that the
subject admits. He next proceeds to compare this outline with the
various received opinions on the subject of happiness, showing that it
embraces much of what has been considered essential by former
philosophers: such as being "a good of the mind," and not a mere
external good: being equivalent to "living well and doing well,"
another definition; consisting in virtue (the Cynics); in practical
wisdom--[Greek: phronaesis] (Sokrates); in philosophy; or in all these
coupled with pleasure (Plato, in the Philebus). Agreeing with those
who insisted on virtue, Aristotle considers his own theory an
improvement, by requiring virtue in act, and not simply in possession.
Moreover, he contends that to the virtuous man, virtuous performance
is in itself pleasurable; so that no extraneous source of pleasure is
needed. Such (he says) is the judgment of the truly excellent man;
which must be taken as conclusive respecting the happiness, as well as
the honourable pre-eminence of the best mental exercises.
Nevertheless, he admits (so far complying with the Cyrenaics) that
some extraneous conditions cannot be dispensed with; the virtuous man
can hardly exhibit his virtue in act, without some aid from friends
and property; nor can he be happy if his person is disgusting to
behold or his parentage vile (VIII.).

But this new cloudy political cowardice has rendered useless

the old English compromise
But this new cloudy political cowardice has rendered useless
the old English compromise. People have begun to be
terrified of an improvement merely because it is complete.
They call it utopian and revolutionary that anyone should really
have his own way, or anything be really done, and done with.
Compromise used to mean that half a loaf was better than no bread.
Among modern statesmen it really seems to mean that half a loaf
is better than a whole loaf.